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In this paper we use data from a large nationally representative survey in Russia to 
analyze the distributional and welfare implications of the military draft. We focus on 
draft avoidance as a common response to highly unpopular conscription system ridden by 
corruption. We develop a simple theoretical model that describes household compliance 
decisions with respect to enlistment. We employ several econometric techniques to 
estimate the effect of various household characteristics on the probability to serve in the 
army and the implications for household income. Our results indicate that the burden of 
conscription falls disproportionately on the poor. Poor, low-educated, rural households 
are much more likely to have their sons enlisted compared to urban, wealthy and better-
educated families. The losses incurred by the poor are disproportionately large and 
exceed the statutory rates of personal income taxes.  
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Each year approximately 400,000 young men between the ages of eighteen and twenty-
seven are drafted to serve two years in the Russian military forces. Although all young 
men in Russia have a duty under the law to perform military service, many manage to 
avoid it with less than 10 percent of eligible population actually being enlisted. 
Conscription is very unpopular in Russia and is perceived as a drag on household 
resources and human lives. Intuitively it is clear that such a system is prone to produce 
regressive outcomes, with rich shifting the burden to the poor, and the unfairness of the 
current conscription practices motivates to some extent ongoing debates on the military 
reform. A switch to a professional army is heralded by many opponents to the existing 
system as a preferred outcome on both efficiency and equity grounds. However, none of 
the arguments used so far in that polemics are informed by the rigorous economic 
analysis.  
It is surprising how little is known about the economic effects of the military draft 
in Russia, given the interest in this subject in all strands of Russian society. There is not a 
single academic study known to us that covers that topic in Russia. This paper intends to 
fill this gap providing first empirical evidence on the distributional implication of military 
draft. 
  In that we rely on a body of literature dealing with the economic costs of 
conscription. Distributional implications of the draft system have not received much 
interest in the economic literature (Lau, Poutvaara and Wagener 2002). Most of the 
studies on that subject originated in the U.S. during the war in Vietnam, surrounded by 
public discussion leading to the reform of the system of military manpower procurement. 
Several of these studies focused mostly on labor market implications of the military 
service (e.g., Fisher 1969, Angrist 1990) and considered economic costs of the 
conscription as implicit tax (e.g., Hansen and Weisbrod 1967; Knapp 1973). One recent 
study analyzed the long-term impact of military service on human capital accumulation to 
evaluate economy-wide consequences of compulsory services within the general 
equilibrium framework (Lau, Poutvaara and Wagener 2002). Social capital aspects of 
draft are analyzed by Mulligan and Shleifer (2004) using the cross-country data.   
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The interest in the economic consequences of the conscript practices is growing in 
the developing countries. Several recent studies address that issue in Latin American 
context (e.g., Cameron Dorleng and Torpe 2000 in Honduras; Meznar 1992 in Brazil). 
However, none of these studies investigates the distributional impacts of compulsory 
military service using micro-level data. Partly, that could be explained by the perception 
that military draft welfare losses are negligible compared to other factors influencing 
household well-being. Indeed, defense spending represents a small share of country 
budgets and military personnel costs are usually just a fraction of these spending. 
However, it is important to distinguish between the direct, intermediate burden of defense 
expenditures and the real costs to the society that could be large, long-term and fall 
disproportionately on the poor.  
The difficulties of analyzing the distributional implications of military draft stem 
from the complexity of household reactions to the recruitment practices. Serving in the 
army is an important event that has multiple long and short-term implications for the 
liable individuals and their households. Such implications span across economic and non-
economic dimensions of well-being and affect different groups of population to a 
different degree. Anticipated enlistment kicks off a chain reaction affecting all 
dimensions of households life, well before the actual recruitment. The inferences based 
on direct comparisons of outcomes between the households with serving members and 
the rest of population will be biased. Identifying the effect of draft on the household 
imposes strict requirements on data. In most of the cases in the developing countries, we 
lack information about draftees’ socio-economic background. Household surveys, on 
other hand, collect no information on the household members enlisted in the military
2.  
  In this paper we develop a simple theoretical model that describes household 
compliance decisions with respect to military draft. This model motivates our empirical 
approach. We employ several econometric techniques to estimate the effect of various 
household characteristics on the probability to serve in the army and the draft-induced 
losses of household income. The analysis is based on the data from the large 
                                                 
2 Using the standard definition of a household, the individuals absent from a household for an extended 
period of time are not counted as household members and no detailed information is collected on them.  
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representative multi-topic household survey conducted by the Russia Statistical Agency 
in 2003. 
Our results indicate that military service effects are not distributionally neutral. 
Poor, low-educated, rural households are more likely to have their sons enlisted 
compared to urban, wealthy and better-educated households. The losses incurred by the 
poor measured as a share of forgone wages in total household income are also 
disproportionately large. These losses are comparable in size to the income taxes 
currently existing in Russia. They potentially affect all households with male children at 
some point in their lifecycle.  
 Compulsory  military  service with non-universal enforcement is a typical feature 
of government policies in many developing economies. By explicitly linking the military 
draft with poverty observed at the household level this paper contributes to the broad 
debate on the effects of public policies on poverty. Forming military cadre through 
conscription is not widely regarded as an intervention that could have direct implications 
for poverty and inequality. Our paper is an attempt to attract attention of the research 
community interested in poverty and social impact analysis to this unduly overlooked 
domain. 
  The paper is organized as follows. Next section provides a description of the 
system of military personnel procurement in Russia. Section 3 gives details on the data, 
describes the main constructed variables used in the analysis, and contains a snapshot of 
the current incidence of military service with characteristics of draftees. We then follow 
in Section 4 with the development of the theoretical framework and empirical 
specifications to analyze the distributional implications of military service. Section 5 
presents the main estimation results of household enlistment decision. Section 6 looks in 
depth on monetary costs of military service and Section 7 concludes.  
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2. Russian Military Service 
 
The Russian military currently have 1.2 million personnel staffed by mandatory 
conscripts and professional cadre
3. The conscription is regulated by the Law on military 
service (GoR 1998). That law, while in principle retaining an obligation of all fit males 
between the ages of 18 and 27 to perform a military service (in force since 1919), 
introduced a number of exemptions and enabled alternative civil service. Exemptions are 
given based on medical conditions, to the full-time students of selected universities, and 
employees of certain organizations (e.g., police). Among the exempt are also the school 
teachers working in the rural areas, young husbands whose wives are 26 or more weeks 
pregnant, and young fathers of two or more children and of children under 3 years of age.  
The number of draftees has been declining rapidly since mid-80s and it becomes 
increasingly difficult for Russian military recruitment offices to fill annual draft quotas. 
The latest report by the Russia Defense Minister indicates that armed forces drafted 30 
percent of 18 to 27 year old males in the late 80s and early 90s. Only about 9.5 percent in 
that age group are planed to be conscripted in the fall of 2004. It coincided with the 
changes in Russia demographics with fewer and fewer young men coming to a 
conscription age (Hrustalev and Csumbal 2004). 
The contraction in the number of conscripts outpaced the planed downsizing of 
the armed forces driven by the Russia military reform. Service in the army remains a 
feared duty to be avoided (through legal or illegal means) by the majority of Russian 
families. Serious abuses in the army are well known. Almost every day, news media 
reports stories on abysmal conditions in Russia army: Soldiers are often underfed and 
lack proper medical attention; first year draftees are abused by officers and second-year 
soldiers (the practice of hazing called “dedovshchina”), decaying equipment poses risks 
of serious injuries and death. Many young soldiers fear to be dispatched to Chechnya 
where ongoing conflict continues to claim lives. The desperation of the young soldiers 
leads to attempts to desert and to an increasing number of suicides. The military estimates 
that 2,500 to 3,000 soldiers desert the army every year (HRW 2002) and the number of 
                                                 
3 Lately, in addition to conscripts, rank-and-file soldiers and sergeants are being staffed by contractual-
employment, which still constitute a small minority of army personal (about 15,000 contract soldiers 
according to the MoD plans for 2004). Higher ranks were always made-up of professional soldiers.  
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suicides exceeds the comparable statistics in armies of other European Countries and 
USA (MoD press release 2004).  
Widespread aversion to military service makes the recruitment officers to rely on 
coercion in filling the draft quotas. The selective enforcement in enlisting young draftees 
leads to discriminatory outcomes in which the poor and unprotected fall victims. Many 
young men accused of dodging the country's mandatory draft are arrested by police and 
sent off to military bases. Police often abuse their authority to serve draft notices by 
illegally arresting conscription-age men. Legitimate exemptions are ignored, as are legal 
rights of appeal and even basic rights such as the ability to contact relatives. The well-off, 
on the other hand, often can avoid the draft through influence, bribery and other means. 
 
3. Data and descriptive profile of Russian conscripts 
 
One of the main difficulties of studying the effects of the military draft on household 
behavior is that the draft in Russia is relatively rare event affecting less then 10 percent of 
households with males 18 to 27 years of age. Household surveys of a standard sample 
size (4000-6000 households) would most likely miss such group completely, or collect 
information on a small sample of affected households that it would preclude any 
meaningful inferences
4. The uniquely large NOBUS survey provides sufficient coverage 
and contains specific questions regarding enlistment. 
Data for this study comes from Round I of the National Survey of Household 
Welfare and Program Participation (NOBUS) collected by the Russia State Statistics 
Service in collaboration with the World Bank. It was carried out in April and May 2003 
and covered a sample of approximately 45,000 households and 118,000 individuals. 
NOBUS is a cross-sectional survey that uses a three-stage stratified sample design and is 
representative on the national, and on the regional level for 46 selected regions (GKS 
2004).  
  NOBUS instruments resemble closely the questionnaires of the standard LSMS-
type survey. NOBUS gathers information about demographic characteristics of the 
                                                 
4 For example, data from the latest (2003) round of the Russia Longitudinal Monitoring Survey contains 
information on 35 households with members in military and only 7 individuals ages 18 to 27 are reported to 
be drafted.  
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household members, health, education, their main and secondary job activities, as well as 
individual sources of income and the amounts of wages, pensions and other social 
transfers. On the household level, the survey collects detailed data on different kinds of 
household expenditures, sources and amounts of household income, housing conditions, 
information on assets and home-production activities.  
An important, for the purposes of the present study, feature of NOBUS is that it 
collects information (age, gender and the reasons of absence) about all household 
members who are absent from the household for more than three months. The households 
with individuals of the conscript age who were absent for the reason of the regular 
military service or draft comprise the core sample for our analysis. We are able to 
identify 466 households with individuals in the military service. 
As the household welfare indicator we use the welfare ratios given by total 
household expenditure as a proportion of a household-specific poverty line. Total 
monthly expenditure includes household expenditures on food, clothing and foot-ware, 
expenditures on health, education, recreation, housing expenditures and utilities, flow of 
services from durables, and expenditures on miscellaneous goods and services. 
We use the cost-of-basic-needs type poverty lines, that were developed based on 
the region-specific food prices to cost the age-gender specific food baskets necessary to 
meet dietary intake levels satisfying WHO/FAO recommended daily caloric requirements 
(WHO 1985). In order to adjust for non-food expenditures the poverty line was scaled up 
by the coefficient that represents the average share of non-food expenditures of the 
household whose total food expenditures equal the food poverty line (Ravallion 1994)
5. 
Wages of the household members are calculated as a sum of monthly wages on 
the main and secondary job activities.  
In our analysis we identify the population subject to conscription as able males 18 
to 27 years of age. Table 1 shows the profile of males in the military service by age in full 
years. Overall, our data indicate that 5.1 percent of conscript-age males were in military 
service in 2003 (weighed estimate of 455,000 conscripts)
6. These numbers correspond 
                                                 
5 Detailed description of the algorithms for constructing household consumption aggregates and poverty 
lines see (Tesliuk and Sajaia 2004). 
6 The low proportion of 18 year olds in the military could be explained by the timing of the survey that was 
conducted just before or during the spring draft of 2003.   
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well with the official Russian military statistics. For example, in the fall of 2004 Russian 
Defense Minister reported the result of semiannual conscription campaign announcing 
that 176,000 young males (of 9.5 percent of liable population) will be drafted into the 
two-year military service (Interfax 2004)
7. According to the US-based Center for Defense 
Information (2004), around 400,000 young men between the ages of 18 and 27 are 
drafted each year to serve in one of the country's many branches of the armed forces. In 
addition to up to 80 percent of all eligible males who could be legally exempted from the 
service, approximately 30,000 dodge the draft each year (MK 2004). 
Our data show that more than 90 percent of conscripts are younger than 23 years 
old. Almost 13 percent of 19 year olds males in our sample are in the military followed 
by 11.7 percent among 20-year-old males. The proportion of conscripts decline with age 
and our data show no conscript military personnel older than 26 years old. 
The likelihood to serve in the army varies with the household size (Figure 1). The 
lowest proportion of conscripts is registered among the smaller households. Less then 2 
percent of sons in the families of single parent (usually a mother) are drafted. The 
probability of serving in the army reaches almost 8 percent for large households. Looking 
at the proportion of conscripts by the type of locality, the likelihood to be drafted is 
increasing almost monotonically for smaller size location. For example, young males 
living in Russia capital cities (Moscow and St. Petersburg) are almost 6 times less likely 
to be drafted compared with those from rural areas of Russia, where proportion of 
conscripts reaches 11 percent.  
The military service should be evaluated against the background of economic 
opportunities that the conscripts have. Table 2 summarizes the descriptive statistics on 
the main labor market outcomes for the youth in draft-age group. Rates of labor force 
participation (LFP) are relatively low for the youngest (18 to 19 year old) but they 
increase sharply with age and reach over 70 percent for the men older than 22. Similar to 
the LFP profile, wages increase with age and tenure. A new male entrant in the labor 
market earns roughly 50 percent less then the person with some labor experience. 
Military draft affects a large group of youth in their critical years of entry into the labor 
                                                 
7 A discrepancy in the estimated proportion of draftees between MoD and NOBUS could arise from the 
different definitions of liable population.  
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market and it distorts their working histories possibly leading to some losses of incomes 
over the entire work-life horizon. Next Section looks at how these losses are taken into 
consideration by the household as a decision-making unit.  
 
4. Theoretical framework and empirical strategy 
 
The presence of military draft affects economy-wide resource allocation. Compulsory 
military service inflicts direct short-term costs to households with male children. These 
costs could be associated with forgone market earnings of the conscripts and with the 
losses in the production of household-specific goods. Early economic studies, especially 
in the US, interpret these costs as implicit tax on household (e.g., Fisher 1969; Hansen 
and Weisbroad 1967). The hardship and risk of the military service could produce 
additional welfare losses for a draftee and members of his household. The long-term 
negative implications of the service are as important as the short-term costs. Empirical 
studies (e.g. Angrist 1991; Imbens and van der Klauw 1995) suggest that yearly costs to 
former conscripts could range between 5 and 15 percent of annual earnings over their 
lifetime. The impact of the military service on human capital formation could be a key 
cause for these losses.  
  Some countries attempt to introduce incentives that would motivate young men to 
enlist. Among such incentives are monetary compensations (stipends), training in 
marketable skills, tuitions credits and promotion of military service as patriotic duty. In 
the system of the compulsory service, as exists in Russia, soldiers receive negligible or 
zero monetary compensation. The military training obtained during the service is hardly 
transferable to civil occupations. Vanishing trust in the army and emerging divide 
between the military and the civil society means that the obligation to serve in the 
military is perceived as a burden and not as a duty even on moral grounds. ADD HERE 
Induction to military service in Russia is not a predetermined, exogenous event. 
Trying to avoid conscription households engage into various activities reducing the risk 
of enlistments. The regulations leave a large room for discretion on behalf of public 
officials to decide who is going to serve in the army. That unavoidably leads to  
  11
emergence of legal and illegal markets for draft-avoiding services
8. The illegal ways to 
avoid conscription range from the bribery of medical doctors who ensure that the 
potential enlistees are labeled as unfit, to the existence of would-be universities that are 
created only on paper solely to provide exemptions from the army for their “students”.  
There are many efficiency and equity implications of the forced recruitment in the 
military service. If looked as a tax, the conscription induces efficiency losses. But in 
contrast with a tax the military draft is avoided by a majority of liable population and this 
produces inequitable distribution of such losses. To disentangle complex interactions of 
various factors that influence resource allocation decisions of the households subject to 
military draft we develop a simple theoretical model.  
Consider a two-period, lifecycle economic model where parents make decisions 
about investments in the human capital of their children. The household gives up current 
consumption at period one for future utility flows that depend on the amounts invested in 
human capital. These investments begin to pay off during time period two.  
Let the returns to human capital H be denoted by r. Let ch be the per unit cost of 
inputs to the labor market human capital production function f(H),with f(H)’>0 and 
f(H)’’<0. Then, the amount spent on the production of labor market human capital is 
ch·H. Let the parent’s current utility be given by Ut(Ct) (Ut’>0; Ut’’<0 for t=1,2), where 
parents can give up some consumption C1 for investments in their children’s human 
capital (U2 is interpreted as a value function). We assume that the current endowments of 
the household are exogenous and given by Y, household is credit constraint, and 
household cannot save in period 1 to finance consumption in period 2. The formal 
optimization model facing the household in time period 1 is then: 
) (
) 1 ( : . .
) , ( ) , (
2
1
2 2 1 1
H f r C
H c Y C t s






Where  X is a household-specific vector of shift parameters of taste. The household 
chooses optimal level of investment in human capital H
* that maximizes its utility. In this 
                                                 
8 Prior to the introduction of the professional army in the Netherlands, for example, there were lawyers 
specializing service that would help to avoid military conscription, with clients willing to spend up to 
$2500 to stay out of the military (Imbens and van der Klauw 1995).  
  12
simple setup, where we consider only interior solutions (C1,C2,H>0), the household 
demand for human capital is a function H
*=H(r,ch,Y,X).  
  We model the influence of the military draft on households with male children 
through its effects on human capital accumulation. Model (1) could be modified to take 
into account the losses in human capital associated with the military service. These losses 
M are assumed to be a linear function of years spent in the army. In addition, we 
introduce a household-specific cost B that is paid to avoid the conscription. Under these 
assumptions, the model of household decision about human capital investment could be 
presented as a choice between two regimes. In the first regime a household chooses to 
pay cost B and avoid conscription, in the second, a household accepts the draft and the 
associated losses of human capital in the second period but does not bear the cost of B. 
The utility maximization problems for these two regimes could be expressed as: 
) ( ) (
(2) : drafted get    nothing, pay    - 2   Regime    : draft   avoid   cost, pay  -   1   Regime
: . .
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where H1 and H2 are the levels of human capital investment associated with two regimes. 
The existence of two regimes allows us to formulate the conditions under which a 
household is indifferent between draft and draft-avoidance. The examination of switching 
condition sheds light on household choices in the face of military conscription (See 
Annex 1 for details).  
The FOC of (2) gives the household demand functions for H1 and H2 as 
H1,2=H(r,ch,Y,B,M,X). The household compares the values of the utility functions 
achieved at the optimum for the two regimes and selects the regime with the highest 
utility. The household prefers to pay a cost and avoid conscription (Regime 1) if 
M·ch>B, the household accepts to have its member enlisted if M·ch<B, and the 
household is indifferent between draft and avoidance if M·ch=B. Note that if B>Y the 
household always chooses an enlistment Regime 2. 
The intuition behind these switching conditions is fairly obvious. The higher is 
the cost of avoidance the less likely the household pays that cost and the more likely it is  
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to yield to conscription. On the other hand, increasing losses from service reduce the 
probability of the household to select Regime 2. Higher costs of acquiring human capital 
increase the attractiveness of military service. Applying the implicit function theorem to 
the FOC, it is easy to demonstrate that under both regimes, the optimal level of human 
capital investment is lower than in the absence of military draft (Model 1).  
This model gives several testable predictions. Given the relationship between Y 
and selection of the regime we would expect richer households to be more likely to avoid 
draft. Inter-household heterogeneity of draft-avoidance costs would also influence the 
likelihood of serving in the army. If, for example, the enforcement of conscription is 
location-specific, the households in low-enforcement areas will have lower probability of 
service compared with the similar households in the high-enforcement locations. The 
efficiency of transferring the accumulated human capital into the market returns, which 
could depend on individual characteristics of the potential draftees, would also affect the 
households choice of the regimes. 
It is not unrealistic to assume that the utility losses due to the effects of military 
service differ across households and depend on household characteristics. For households 
with a single child liable for the military draft, a potential loss of human capital could 
have a stronger impact on the total welfare compared to the households with two sons. 
According to our model, the utility loss in period 2 resulting from death or serious injury 
of the enlisted single son moves households into part of the inter-temporal consumption 
space where the marginal utility of the period 2 consumption is high. That induces higher 
willingness to pay for draft-avoidance, other things being equal. 
 Our theoretical model guides the selection of the empirical estimation methods. 
The utility-comparison nature of the regime-switching process leads to the standard 
estimation setup. Switching conditions of equation (2) could be rewritten in the form: 

















* X C U X C U X C U X C U D + − + =  
where D
* represents unobserved difference in utilities between the two regimes. We 
assume that D
* has a positive lower bound as consumption approach to zero, and that D
* 
is also bounded above as consumption approach infinity. The existence of the regime 
switching point (D
*=0) in a general case follows from the Brouwer’s fixed-point theorem 
given our boundedness conditions and as long as D
* is continuous (e.g., Border 1985).  
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Households make a marginal benefit-cost comparison based on utilities achieved in each 
regime. Household chooses Regime 1 if D
*≤0 and Regime 2 if D
*>0. Assuming that D
* 
is linear in parameters (but possibly non-linear in variables) we can model the difference 
in the costs and benefits as an unobserved continuous variable D
* such that:  
) 4 ( otherwise   0
0  D if   1 and
* *
=
> = + ⋅ =
i
i i i i i
d
d X D ε β
 
where di is an indicator of the observed event of conscription, Xi is a vector of  household 
characteristics and εi is an error term. If we assume that εi  is distributed normally, 
equation (4) could be estimated by the ordinary binary probit. 
However, this estimation is complicated by the problem of endogeneity. 
Depending on the selected strategy, households adjust their behavior well in advance of 
the actual event of conscription. These adjustments could affect a broad spectrum of 
household characteristics including the labor market behavior and other income 
generating activities of the household members, the household long-term saving and asset 
accumulation decisions, and, obviously, the household income. Empirical specifications 
that include any such variables would produce biased estimates. In particular, the 
endogeneity precludes us from directly estimating the effect of the household income on 
the probability of conscription – one of the important issues of our analysis. 
To account for the endogeneity of the household income we employ two 
strategies. First, we estimate the ordinary probit model including a set of assets 
ownership indicators that could proxy the household income prior to the conscription. We 
construct these indicators based on the information about assets purchased no later than 
two years before to the probable event of the military draft. We assume this lagged asset 
index is not directly affected by the conscription. The second strategy is based on the 
instrumental variable approach. We estimate the binary equation (4) jointly with the 
regression equation that instruments the current per capita consumption with the same 
assets index and asset ownership dummies we used in the first specification (further in 
the text we refer to this specification as IV probit model). Formally, this estimation 
algorithm could be expressed as the two-equation simultaneous model (e.g., Maddala 
1983 p. 120):  
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and X1 and X2 are vectors of weakly exogenous variables. The identification conditions in 
this model are that disturbance terms ε1 and ε2 are independent, or else there is at least 
one variable in X1 that is not included in X2. Assuming that (X1, ε1, ε2) are i.i.d., and ε1 
and ε2 have, conditional on X1, a joint normal distribution with mean zero and positive 
definite covariance matrix, the system of equations (5) could be estimated by Full 
Information Maximum Likelihood method
9. 
 
5. Estimation results 
 
We estimate the factors explaining the probability of the household to have its son drafted 
using binary and IV probit models. The estimations are based on the sample of 6126 
households with male youth aged 18 to 27 in good health (group liable to serve in the 
army). The results of estimations are shown in Table 3. 
The theoretical model of the previous section directs the selection of explanatory 
variables. They include the household demographic composition, educational levels of 
the adult members of the household, type of the locality the household resides in, and 
occupation of the household head. In the data we do not observe any characteristics of the 
draftees other then their age and the fact that they are currently serving in the military. 
Instead, we have to use some proxies for the individual characteristics of the enlisted men 
such as educational achievements of a household head and education profile of other 
household members. To reflect the difference in the local labor market conditions and in 
the systems of draft enforcement we use two constructed variables – the unemployment 
rate and proportion of the young males drafted in the locality
10.  
                                                 
9 Log-likelihood function for the system of system (4) is: 
)]) ( ln[ )] ( 1 )(ln[ 1 ( )]) ( ln[ )] ( (ln[ ln 1 1 i i i i i i i f F y f F y L η η η η + − − + + =∑ , where F is a cumulative normal 
distribution function, f is a normal density distribution function, ρ is a correlation between ε1 and ε2, and 
2
2 2 2 1 1 1 / ) / ) ( (( ρ σ β ρ β η − − + = i i i i x Y x . 
10 These aggregate statistics are calculated based on the sample of about 150 households per each 79 
locations. Our main estimation standard errors are not adjusted for the errors associated with these 
calculated statistics.  
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Both binary and IV probit specifications give qualitatively similar results. The key link 
tested by these models is the effect of household income on the probability to serve. In 
the binary probit estimation, the household income is proxied by the lagged asset index. 
As predicted by our theoretical model, the effect is negative and significant. Other set of 
variables related to the household potential to generate income, - educational attainment 
of household members, - has even larger (and significant) coefficients. The larger is the 
share of highly educated adults in the household the less likely such household is to have 
its sons in the army. The IV probit estimation also indicates strong negative effect of the 
household consumption (instrumented by the assets ownership index) on the likelihood of 
military service. The effects of household members’ education are similar to the 
coefficients of the binary probit estimations. 
In line with predictions, households with a single son are much less likely to have 
him enlisted. The coefficients on the household size variables suggest the non-linear 
effect on the probability to serve. The probability is declining with size for the household 
with four or less members, and it increases for the larger households. A large share of 
prime-age males and females in the household as well as the share of pensioners has 
positive and significant effects on the probability to serve in the army.  
Strong location effects picked up by the variable reflecting the regional share of 
youth serving in the army, reflects spatial differences in draft enforcement. This 
relationship holds even controlling for the labor market conditions in the region. In terms 
of our theoretical model, this implies that different regions are characterized by the 
different costs of draft-avoidance. 
Similar to findings of the descriptive analysis of conscription, the estimation 
generates strong and significant correlation of the military draft incidence with the size of 
settlements. Males residing in the cities with population over 100,000 have much lower 
probability to be drafted compared to those living in smaller towns and villages. That 
probability is declining for the larger cities in both specifications. 
Presence of professional military personnel in the family shows no statistically 
significant influence on the probability to serve. This may suggest that having their 
children enlisted as rank-and-file soldiers is not an attractive option even for the families 
of military officers.  
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  Other variables in the model introduced to mimic conscription rules, such as 
health conditions of other household members and single parent household indicator fail 
to produce any significant results. 
  We simulate the relationship between household wealth and the probability to 
serve in the army using the results of our estimations. Figure 2 is composed of three 
panels. All graphs indicate that wealthier households are less likely to have their sons 
conscripted. Top row graphs show the simulations for household with military service 
liable males. Graph on the left presents the predicted probability to be enlisted (using the 
IV probit estimates) as a function of per capita real consumption. The probability ranges 
from almost 20 percent for the lowest consumption percentiles to less then 3 percent for 
the richest households. The graph on the right is based on the alternative measure of 
household wealth, lagged asset index, and constructed using the ordinary binary probit 
estimates. It also demonstrates negative correlation between wealth and the likelihood of 
enlistment. However, the relationship is weaker than for the instrumented per capita 
consumption, which is not surprising given the noisiness of the asset index as a proxy of 
wealth. 
  In interpreting the results presented on these diagrams it is important to keep in 
mind that what we attempt to measure is the relationship between the enlistment and 
counterfactual consumption that the households with a drafted member would have had 
prior to the event of conscription. It is clear that ex ante household consumption is 
unobservable for all households with members of serviceable age, regardless of whether 
they were actually enlisted or avoided the draft. While we try to approximate this 
counterfactual consumption by instruments in the IV probit specification and by lagged 
asset index in the binary probit model, another way to explore the relationship between 
wealth and military service is to predict the probability of future military service for the 
households with sons of pre-draft age, i.e., 16 to 17 year old. For this group we can rely 
on their actual per capita consumption rather than proxies. Lowest panel of Figure 2 
reports results of such simulation. This alternative route yields very similar results with 
the results reported above. Again, the poorest households have the highest probability to 
be enlisted and the richest households seem to be more likely to avoid the draft.  
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6. Monetary burden of the military draft 
 
Our theoretical model of Section 4 and the empirical estimations of the previous section 
give insights about which households attempt to avoid military service. We conceptualize 
the household decision-making by taking into considerations long-terms factors, such as 
human capital formation. In addition to the long-term burden, military service can have 
short-term welfare costs. On one hand, these costs could result from a wide spectrum of 
behavioral changes that households initiate in response to the event of conscription. On 
the other hand, the short-term welfare costs could be associated with the direct loss of 
wages due to the draft. We can simulate the immediate opportunity cost of a household 
member serving in the military as wages forgone due to being drafted (e.g., Hansen and 
Weisbrod 1967).  
To quantify the differential burden of military service on the household well-
being we need to estimate wages that the currently serving household members would 
earn have they avoided the draft. Such estimations are normally based on the models 
relating the individual characteristics with the labor market returns (e.g., Mincer type 
earning function). The survey we use collects only age data for the serving men. We miss 
critical information (an education level and tenure) necessary to obtain reliable wage 
predictions. Therefore, the wage estimates of such individuals would be imprecise. 
To get around this problem, we adopt a strategy similar to one we used for ex ante 
consumption predictions in the previous section. We proceed in two stages. First, we 
estimate the selection-bias-corrected (Heckman 1978) earning functions for working 
young males for whom we observe wages and individual characteristics
11. At the next 
stage, we turn our attention to pre-draft age males. Based on the estimated earning 
function we extrapolate the expected monthly wages for the males aged 16 to 17 to the 
point when they will reach the age of military service
12. We also have information on 
their probability to serve in the army from the probit estimations. Combining these two 
results, we assess the expected current losses of monetary earnings from the conscription. 
                                                 
11 We use household size, household demographic composition, assets ownership and regional 
unemployment rate as instruments in the selection equation. 
12 This interpolation is implemented by adding one year to the reported age of pre-draft males and assuming 
the completion of their education spell.  
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The assumption that we make by using this group of households is that all their 
characteristics are very similar to the characteristics of the households with sons in a 
older age cohort. After all, the only difference between these two groups is that their sons 
are one year younger.  
Formally, our simulation algorithm could be described as follows. Let 
Pw(Work=1) be the probability to participate in the labor market, Pd(Serve=1) be a 
probability to be drafted, and E(w|Work=1) be an expected conditional wage. Then the 
expected monthly wage losses due to the military service are: 
E(L)= Pd(Serve=1) ·Pw(Work=1) ·E(w|Work=1)   (6) 
Relating these wage losses to household consumption gives us a measure of welfare 
impact from the enlistment. As we argued above, a proper measure of a welfare burden 
should be constructed using not observed, but ex ante consumption. Since we limit our 
attention to the sample of households with pre-draft males, we assume that their actual 
consumption is not yet affected by the conscription
13.  
The relative importance of losses associated with conscription could be captured 
by the ratio of the expected forgone wages to the total household consumption. Wages of 
the new entrants to the labor market are usually low, but even these low wages can 
represent a substantial addition to the income of the households in poverty. A loss of 
these wages could push a household into a poverty trap. At the same time for wealthier 
households, this potential income source will be trivial.  
Table 4 presents the selection-bias corrected estimation of the wage regression for 
the sample of males 18 to 26 years of age. The estimations produce sensible results. 
Expectedly, we observe strong locational wage effects. Controlling for age and education, 
youth living in villages earns lowest wages in comparison to the young males living in 
urban areas of Russia. Highest wages are registered in Moscow and Saint Petersburg. 
Older individuals, workers with longer tenure, and males with higher education earn 
higher wages. The level of labor force participation of young men is significantly affected 
                                                 
13 Our approach neglects an important problem of a bias in wage estimation associated with the non-
random (in terms of abilities and, correspondingly, of potential wages) characteristics of the conscripted 
individuals. In general, we cannot evaluate the direction of such bias, but, if, as our estimations show, the 
individuals with low prospects in the labor market are more likely to be conscripted, our wage estimates 
would be overstated for such men.  
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by their age, educational and demographic composition of the household they live in, and 
by regional unemployment rate. 
Results of this estimation are used to calculate expected forgone wages for the 
pre-draft age males. Multiplying these estimates by the probability to serve in the army 
according to (6) we obtain expected monthly wage losses due to the military service. 
Figure 3 shows the results. The estimated ratios range from the highest 50 percent to 
almost zero for the wealthiest households. The poor are disproportionately affected by 
such losses. On average, households below the poverty line (welfare ratio of 1 on the 
graph) experience about 15 percent loss in their per capita consumption due to the 
forgone wages as opposed to an average 6 percent for the households above the poverty 
line. Conceptualizing opportunity cost of military service as a tax we see, for the poor 
households, order of magnitudes similar to the rates of personal income taxes in Russia. 
Most important, such a tax is regressive as opposed to the flat 13 percent rate for the 
income tax. Although the military draft is not regarded as redistribution policy, the way it 




In this paper we looked at the distributional implications of a peculiar system of military 
draft which prevails in many countries, but is not usually analyzed as an economic 
phenomenon. Such system combines formally universal requirements to serve in the 
army with lax enforcement so that the majority of potential conscripts avoid being 
drafted. Resulting distortions have strong efficiency and equity implications that are 
overlooked in the economic literature on development.  
The theoretical model developed in the paper provides several testable hypotheses 
that were confirmed by our empirical results. We demonstrate that military draft has a 
number of negative consequences in terms of household well-being. Our simulations 
show that the burden of the military service is not negligible, amounting, on average, to 
15 percent of household consumption. Rich household have more resources to evade the 
obligation to serve. Our estimates demonstrate that non-poor households in Russia are at 
least three times less likely to have their sons enlisted in the army than the poor.  
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Therefore, losses associated with the military service disproportionately fall on the poor. 
Narrowly defined opportunity cost (expressed as lost wages) of military draft could be as 
high as 30 percent of a poor household per capita consumption. 
Although we rely on Russian data, systems of involuntarily military procurement 
exist in many developing and transition economies. We think that households in these 
countries face similar choices and resulting misallocations could have important 
distributional and welfare implications. We claim that this area needs to be studied much 
more extensively. Theories of household behavior that incorporate long-term household 
decisions about strategies to cope with the cost of military service need to be developed. 
One of the major impediments for such research is the absence of data that would 
adequately capture both long and short-terms implications of the military draft and collect 
the information about histories of household members who served in the military. New 
data are required to better calibrate the magnitudes of the effects involved.  
Our findings have broad policy implications. By demonstrating highly regressive 
features of discretionary enforced non-voluntary conscription into the military the paper 
suggests that poorly governed regulations may have large impact on the poor even tough 
at the first glance they seem to have no connection to redistribution policies. The key 
reason for such distortions could be the opportunity for corruption that opens ways for the 
rich to shift the burden of a costly obligation towards Government (such as an obligation 
to serve) on the poor. 
One important area that we omitted in our paper is a gender dimension of welfare 
losses due to military draft. By distorting human capital formation decisions of the 
households with sons, conscription has general equilibrium effects on the demand for 
human capital of female children and may lead to even wider welfare losses. This can be 
a natural next step in the further development of the proposed model and its empirical 
applications. Another area of the proposed research agenda is related to simulations with 
a tax incidence model on the one hand to mimic the financing option for the volunteer 
army, combined with the cost incidence of the existing system that we covered in this 
paper. 
Our findings have significant implications for the ongoing military reform in 
Russia. We show that the non-universal draft that exists in Russia is inferior to all-  
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volunteer approach to military personnel procurement, not only on efficiency (as widely 
argued), but also, most importantly, on equity grounds.  
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Annex 1 
1.  Optimization problem under “draft-avoidance” choice: 
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Table 1: Percent and the number of males age 18 to 27 in military service in Russia 
Age 
in full years 
Percent 







18 3.26  9.87 46  38450 
19  12.78 38.20  132 142749 
20  11.65 65.24  126 125512 
21 8.75  84.55  90  84899 
22 3.60  93.35  41  37424 
23 1.74  97.00  17  16370 
24 0.74  98.93 9 6639 
25 0.37  100.00  5 3227 
26 0.00  100.00  0  0 
27 0.00  100.00  0  0 
      
Total 5.10  100.00  466 455270 
 
Table 2: Labor market characteristics of male 18 to 26 in Russia 
Age 
in full years 
Rate of labor force 
participation  Log monthly wage  Years of Tenure 
Number of 
observations 
18  11.28 7.564 1.435 1,006 
19  17.98 7.688 1.584 1,015 
20 32.17  7.768  1.823  948 
21 46.31  7.864  2.033  850 
22 66.36  8.016  2.214  860 
23 71.77  8.117  2.449  801 
24 73.60  8.111  2.740  778 
25 76.41  8.136  3.253  724 
26 73.83  8.164  3.297  730 
     
Total 44.18 8.014 2.504 8.803  
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Table 2: Summary statistics for the main explanatory variables 
 Mean  Std. Deviation 
Per capita consumtion/100  2279.512  1604.326 
Household size  3.638  1.162 
Household size2  14.588  10.118 
Share of children 0-6 years old  0.036  0.097 
Share of children 7-14 years old  0.035  0.090 
Share of prime-age men   0.168  0.144 
Share of prime-age women  0.231  0.145 
Share of elderly   0.028  0.096 
Share of adults with primary education  0.034  0.160 
  Incomplete secondary  0.119  0.222 
  Complete secondary  0.261  0.298 
  Technical vocational  0.124  0.233 
  Secondary vocational  0.259  0.296 
  Incomplete higher  0.073  0.169 
 Complete higher and post-graduate  0.130  0.239 
Head with primary education  0.039  0.180 
  Incomplete secondary  0.098  0.297 
  Complete secondary  0.220  0.414 
  Technical vocational  0.111  0.314 
  Secondary vocational  0.323  0.468 
  Incomplete higher  0.031  0.173 
  Complete higher and post-graduate  0.179  0.383 
The son is a single child  0.412  0.492 
Single parent household   0.182  0.386 
Household members in the army  0.014  0.119 
Household members with bad health  0.013  0.065 
Moscow and Saint Petersburg  0.033  0.179 
Cities larger than 1M   0.068  0.252 
Cities 500,000-1M  0.084  0.278 
Cities 250,000-499,900  0.133  0.339 
Cities 100,000-249,900  0.105  0.307 
Towns 50,000-99,900   0.074  0.261 
Towns 20,000-49,900  0.081  0.274 
Towns with less than 20,000, PGT  0.139  0.346 
Villages 0.283  0.322 
Share of young males in service
a) 1.000  0.664 
Regional unemployment rate  0.143  0.093 
Constructed assets index  27.666  54.114 
Household owns a car  0.227  0.419 
Household owns an AC  0.012  0.111 
Household owns a motobike  0.079  0.269 
Household owns a VCR  0.442  0.497 
Household has extra property  0.307  0.461 
 
a) The regional share of male in service is normalized by the national average 
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Table 3: Ordinary probit and IV probit estimations of the probability of the household to 
have its son in the military. 
  Binary probit  IV Probit
a) 
 Coefficient Std. Error  Coefficient  Std. Error 
Per capita consumtion/100      -0.184
**  0.059 
Household size  -0.186
* 0.104  -0.308
**  0.105 
Household size2  0.022
* 0.011  0.030
**  0.01 
Share of children 0-6 years old  -0.719 0.452  -0.891
*  0.432 
Share of children 7-14 years old  -0.487 0.302  -0.574
*  0.288 
Share of prime-age men   0.917
** 0.263  0.932
***  0.248 
Share of prime-age women  1.287
*** 0.237  1.158
***  0.229 
Share of elderly   0.784
* 0.370  0.639
*  0.356 
Share of adults with primary education  Reference     
  Incomplete secondary  -0.910
** 0.265  -0.870
**  0.254 
  Complete secondary  -1.378
*** 0.255  -1.183
***  0.256 
  Technical vocational  -0.698
* 0.271  -0.621
*  0.261 
  Secondary vocational  -1.078
*** 0.264  -0.922
**  0.26 
  Incomplete higher  -2.235
*** 0.348  -1.844
***  0.37 
 Complete higher and post-graduate  -1.414
*** 0.313  -1.146
**  0.322 
Head with primary education  Reference     
  Incomplete secondary  0.086 0.180  0.111  0.172 
  Complete secondary  0.332
* 0.175  0.299
*  0.167 
  Technical vocational  0.019 0.188  0.054  0.18 
  Secondary vocational  0.278 0.178  0.288
*  0.17 
  Incomplete higher  0.477 0.285  0.448  0.27 
  Complete higher and post-graduate  0.274 0.205  0.284  0.194 
The son is a single child  -0.644
*** 0.074  -0.620
***  0.073 
Single parent household   0.043 0.087  0.021  0.083 
Household members in the army  0.015 0.205  0.023  0.194 
Household members with bad health  -0.632 0.482  -0.724  0.458 
Moscow and Saint Petersburg  -0.308 0.260  -0.310  0.251 
Cities larger than 1M   -0.251
* 0.121  -0.264
*  0.113 
Cities 500,000-1M  -0.270
* 0.119  -0.244
*  0.114 
Cities 250,000-499,900  -0.281
** 0.094  -0.262
**  0.09 
Cities 100,000-249,900  -0.224
* 0.099  -0.149  0.101 
Towns 50,000-99,900   -0.175 0.111  -0.107  0.111 
Towns 20,000-49,900  -0.057 0.099  0.005  0.097 
Towns with less than 20,000, PGT  -0.077 0.082  -0.031  0.082 
Villages  Reference     
Share of young males in service  0.451
*** 0.049  0.406
***  0.05 
Regional unemployment rate  -0.233 0.396  -0.510  0.387 
Constructed assets index  -0.002
* 0.001     
Household owns a car  0.097 0.070     
Household owns an AC  -0.161 0.337     
Household owns a motobike  0.165
* 0.091     
Household owns a VCR  -0.123
* 0.058     
Household has extra property  -0.026 0.063     
Constant -0.735
* 0.330  -0.047  0.386 
Log-likelihood/Joint Log-Likelihood  -1408.603 -12036.336 
Number of observations  6126  6126 
a) Estimated coefficients of instrumental regression are shown in Annex 2.  
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Table 4: FIML Selection-bias corrected wage estimation. Wage regression and Selection 
probit estimates. Sample of males age 18-26. 
  Wage regression  Selection probit 
 Coefficient Std. Error  Coefficient  Std. Error 
Age   0.315
† 0.236  1.844
**  0.523 
Age
2 -0.007
† 0.005  -0.041
**  0.012 
  Primary education  Reference     
  Incomplete secondary  -0.139 0.183  0.486  0.404 
  Complete secondary  0.097 0.178  -0.328  0.395 
  Technical vocational  0.035 0.179  -0.413  0.410 
  Secondary vocational  0.089 0.178  0.214  0.407 
  Incomplete higher  0.434
* 0.201  -1.024
*  0.489 
  Complete higher and post-graduate  0.363
* 0.180  -0.320  0.430 
Tenure 0.052
* 0.026  0.209
**  0.062 
Moscow and Saint Petersburg  0.991
*** 0.080  -0.134  0.294 
Cities larger than 1M   0.713
*** 0.073  -0.414
*  0.202 
Cities 500,000-1M  0.737
*** 0.113  0.175  0.214 
Cities 250,000-499,900  0.583
*** 0.079  0.094  0.174 
Cities 100,000-249,900  0.695
*** 0.095  -0.170  0.184 
Towns 50,000-99,900   0.520
*** 0.100  0.328  0.199 
Towns 20,000-49,900  0.482
*** 0.099  0.291  0.214 
Towns with less than 20,000, PGT  0.502
*** 0.093  0.104  0.195 
Villages  Reference     
Household size    0.154  0.152 
Household size2    -0.015  0.015 
Share of children 0-6 years old    0.331  0.485 
Share of children 7-14 years old    -0.335  0.345 
Share of prime-age men     -1.200
*  0.530 
Share of prime-age women    -1.199
*  0.551 
Share of elderly     0.126  0.471 
Share of adults with primary education  Reference     
  Incomplete secondary    -0.238  0.322 
  Complete secondary    -0.879
*  0.314 
  Technical vocational    -0.423  0.343 
  Secondary vocational    -0.357  0.320 
  Incomplete higher    -1.010
*  0.520 
  Complete higher and post-graduate    -0.459  0.330 
Head with primary education  Reference     
  Incomplete secondary    0.774  0.582 
  Complete secondary    2.262
**  0.577 
  Technical vocational    2.209
**  0.618 
  Secondary vocational    1.581
*  0.580 
  Incomplete higher    2.990
**  0.917 
  Complete higher and post-graduate    1.984
**  0.621 
Share of employed household members    -0.302  0.264 
Constructed assets index    0.003  0.002 
Household owns a car    -0.485
**  0.125 
Household owns an AC    -0.703  0.531 
Household owns a motorbike    -0.246  0.185 
Household owns a VCR    0.193  0.113 
Household has extra property    0.113  0.111 
Regional unemployment rate    -2.231
***  0.560 
Constant 3.563 2.594  -20.895
**  5.784 
N       
Note: 
























































Capitals 1M+ 500K 250K 100K 50K 20K <20K Village
Size/type of locality
Figure 1: Proportion of males age 18 to 27 in compulsory military service by household 
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Figure 2: Predicted proportion of males age 18 to 27 in compulsory military service by 
household expenditure as a proportion of poverty line and by asset index. Locally 

























































0 2 4 6 8 10 1
Expenditure as proportion of poverty line
Sample of households with pre-draft age males
 
Figure 3: Simulated distribution of the expected losses from military service as a share of 
total household expenditure. Sample of households with a pre-draft age males. Locally 




Table A2: Instrumental variable regression of the FIML IV probit estimation 
Per capita household consumption   IV regression 
  Coefficient Std. Error 
Household size  -0.796*** 0.074 
Household size2  0.057*** 0.008 
Share of children 0-6 years old  -0.914*** 0.240 
Share of children 7-14 years old  -0.435* 0.215 
Share of prime-age men   0.070 0.173 
Share of prime-age women  -0.287* 0.141 
Share of elderly   -0.537* 0.229 
Share of adults with primary education  Reference  
  Incomplete secondary  -0.177 0.224 
  Complete secondary  0.480* 0.214 
  Technical vocational  0.084 0.227 
  Secondary vocational  0.343 0.219 
  Incomplete higher  1.212*** 0.239 
 Complete higher and post-graduate  0.912*** 0.237 
Head with primary education  Reference  
  Incomplete secondary  0.166 0.136 
  Complete secondary  -0.050 0.131 
  Technical vocational  0.214 0.142 
  Secondary vocational  0.199 0.132 
  Incomplete higher  0.080 0.175 
  Complete higher and post-graduate  0.179 0.144 
The son is a single child  -0.107* 0.046 
Single parent household   -0.022 0.060 
Household members in the army  0.093 0.148 
Household members with bad health  -0.636* 0.277 
Moscow and Saint Petersburg  0.272* 0.116 
Cities larger than 1M   -0.040 0.078 
Cities 500,000-1M  0.142* 0.073 
Cities 250,000-499,900  0.132* 0.061 
Cities 100,000-249,900  0.427*** 0.065 
Towns 50,000-99,900   0.393*** 0.074 
Towns 20,000-49,900  0.308*** 0.071 
Towns with less than 20,000, PGT  0.304*** 0.059 
Villages  Reference  
Share of young males in service  -0.075* 0.036 
Regional unemployment rate  -1.253*** 0.248 
Constructed assets index  0.010*** 0.001 
Household owns a car  0.164** 0.047 
Household owns an AC  -0.750*** 0.175 
Household owns a motobike  -0.316*** 0.068 
Household owns a VCR  0.378*** 0.038 
Household has extra property  0.225*** 0.042 
Constant 3.540*** 0.242 
 